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The intergenerational mobility in education length is well-documented. However, the number 
of people having a master’s degree in Norway has increased in the past years. An innovative 
study is instead to investigate the mobility for the educational fields between generations. 
This thesis is investigating the parents’ influence on their children’s choice of educational 
fields for higher education. The hypotheses state that increased parental incomes increase the 
probability of children choosing a similar education as the parents, that the children are more 
influenced by the parent having the same gender, and that the influence of choosing similar 
education, self-recruitment, is stronger for prestigious educations. The thesis uses Norwegian 
register data from Statistics Norway, and the analysis is done by using the multinomial 
logistic regression, which is directly used through the analytical tool, microdata.no. The 
average marginal effects of children choosing a similar education as the parents, by changes 
of either hourly wage or hour spent at work, are interpreting the results. By a wage increase, 
the results show an increased probability of children choosing a similar education as the 
parents, and these probability increases are higher for educations of high prestige. However, 
the results do not confirm the same-gender hypothesis.  
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Intergenerational mobility explains the relation between children’s and parent’s position on 
the social scale. Income, education, and occupation are factors that describe one’s 
socioeconomic status. Thus, individuals with higher incomes, higher educations, and better 
jobs are seen as having a higher socioeconomic status. To a greater extent, children who live 
in societies with a low degree of intergenerational mobility would get an income or achieve 
education close to their parents (Solon, 1999). Essential approaches covering the research 
about intergenerational mobility are the investigations on whether family background affects 
an individual’s educational attainment. The results show a positive correlation between 
parental background and their children’s educational achievements. The parental influence is 
weaker for the Nordic countries than in other countries (Causa & Johansson, 2011; Hertz et 
al., 2007).   
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) have developed a model that explains intergenerational mobility. 
One of the factors that determine how much children’s income is related to the parents’ 
income is human capital investments. Such investments might develop and support the 
children’s skills and efficiency, which are factors that can affect the choice of whether taking 
take a higher education or not. There is a correlation between education and income, where 
higher education often leads to higher incomes. The parents’ investments in children’s human 
capital are dependent on their income, where higher incomes give possibilities for higher 
human capital investments. Hence, one can see that children having parents with higher 
incomes have a greater possibility of achieving a higher education (Black & Devereux, 2011; 
Corak, 2013).  
 
One motivation for researching intergenerational mobility is the desirable situation where all 
individuals have the same opportunities, independent of family background. In societies 
where the intergenerational mobility is low, children having parents with higher education 
and higher incomes will tend to achieve higher incomes and educations. Similarly, for 
families having lower education and incomes, the children would more often also get lower 
incomes and education (Solon, 1999). Such a situation would lead to inequalities between the 
top and the bottom of the scale, which could lead to an even higher gap for future generations 
if the level of mobility is unchanged.  
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Several studies have investigated the relationship between parents’ and children’s educational 
lengths (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Hertz et al., 2007). However, the number of 
people taking a master’s degree has increased the lasts decades. Statistics from Statistics 
Norway show that the share of people over 16 years old that, in 2019, have a higher education 
is 10 % compared to 7.3% in 2013 (SSB, 2019). Therefore, it might be innovative to research 
the mobility between generations by focusing on different educational fields in higher 
education. The different fields of master’s educations lead to different occupation 
possibilities, which again lead to a spread in the earned incomes between individuals. Some 
education fields often give higher incomes and are therefore more attractive choices between 
the students. There have been shown that parents, to some degree, influence their children to 
attain a certain education length. According to a framework presented by Schneebaum, 
Rumplmaier, and Altzinger (2014) children’s educational attainment are more affected by the 
educational attainment for the parent having the same gender. This master’s thesis will 
investigate whether the children’s choice of educational field is affected by their parents and 
whether the same-gender hypothesis applies to educational fields. 
 
Several sociologists have already shown an interest in this field. Dryler (1998) investigated if 
Swedish children are influenced by their parents’ educational field and occupational sector 
when they choose their educational path at the upper secondary school. Helland (2006) is 
investigating whether the parents’ educational field influence master’s degree students’ choice 
of the educational field. One of the hypotheses is whether the influence is greater for elite 
educations. That is if the self-recruitment is stronger for families with elite educations. 
However, this thesis will investigate the parental influence by using economics theory, with 
the intergenerational mobility theory as the basis. 
 
According to Becker and Tomes (1979) and Black and Devereux (2011), the intergenerational 
mobility model explains that parental income has an impact on the children’s incomes and 
educational attainment. A higher parental income increases the investments in children’s 
human capital, which could affect the children’s educational choices. The focus is on the 
children’s choice of master’s degree educations. However, different educations lead to 
different incomes. Inspired by Helland (2006) and the classification of elite educations he 
uses, the educations in this thesis are separated into three prestige levels, from high prestige to 
low prestige. This categorization of prestige levels is to investigate whether the parents’ 
prestige levels are influencing the children’s educational choice. The educations that classify 
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as high prestige are business & administration, law, some engineer studies, and medicine. 
This classification follows the elite educations by Helland (2006).  
 
The research question for this thesis is separated into three hypotheses. The main focus is to 
investigate whether parents can influence children in choosing a similar education for higher 
education. However, the theory about intergenerational mobility shows that children’s income 
and educational attainment are, to some extent, influenced by the parent’s educational 
background and income. Higher incomes will probably lead to greater influence, which is one 
of the hypotheses that will be tested. The second hypothesis is whether daughters are more 
influenced by mothers and sons more by fathers. The third hypothesis is whether children 
with high prestige educations are more likely to choose a similar education as parents. Lower 
mobility for high prestige can lead to increased inequality in educations.  The research 
question and the hypotheses to be tested are as follows:  
 
Do parents influence their children’s choice of educational fields for master’s degree levels? 
• H1: An increase in parental income makes it more likely that the children choose a 
similar education at the parent 
• H2: The children are more influenced by the parent of the same gender.  
• H3: Self-recruitment is higher for educations of high prestige 
 
Norwegian register data from Statistics Norway is used to address the hypotheses. These 
register data are available through the newly launched analytics tool, microdata.no. The topic 
of interest is whether children choose a similar education as the mothers or the fathers, or 
whether they chose a different education. Hence, the multinomial logistic model is an 
appropriate model to use. 
 
The next section will present a theoretical model that explains intergenerational mobility and 
a few empirical literature reviews. The third section will describe the data set and the chosen 
variables. The fourth section will, in detail, describe the analytical model that is used for 
estimation, the multinomial logistic model. The fifth section will present the estimated results. 





2.1 Intergenerational mobility  
 
Intergenerational mobility, in general, is describing the relation between parents’ and their 
children’s position on the socioeconomic scale, which include factors like income and 
education (Becker & Tomes, 1979; Causa & Johansson, 2011; Solon, 1999). In societies 
having a lower degree of intergenerational income mobility, one would have a higher 
prediction about the children’s incomes by already knowing the parents’ position on the 
income distribution (Corak, 2013; Solon, 1999). This specific situation would, to a higher 
degree, limit the children’s pay-offs compared to societies having a higher level of 
intergenerational mobility, where the socioeconomic connection between children and parents 
is less decisive (Narayan et al., 2018). This illustration also applies to education. The 
educational mobility is low if the educational persistence between parents and children are 
close. 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) have developed a theoretical model that explains what is meant by 
intergenerational mobility. The interest in studying intergenerational mobility, among 
economists, started with this model. The model shows how children’s wealth or outcome is 
dependent both on their parents’ wealth, and their parents’ investments in their human capital. 
Investments in human capital are investments that, through improve individual’s resources, 
increase future income, like education (Becker, 1962). To describe intergenerational mobility, 
Becker and Tomes (1979), and Guner (2015) presenting a simplified model, show the parents’ 
utility as a function dependent on their own consumption, Ct, and their children’s wealth, It+1, 
written as:  
 
		𝑈! = 𝑈!(𝐶! , 𝐼!"#)                                (2.1)                                        
 
The utility is maximized subject to  
 
𝐼! = 𝐶! + 𝑋!"# + ℎ!"# 
             (2.2) 
𝐼!"# = 𝑤!"#𝐻(ℎ!"#, 𝐺!"#, 𝑒!"#) + (1 + 𝑟)𝑋!"# + 𝑢!"# 
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Where the parents’ budget constraint shows that their income is spent on their own 
consumption, on any financial transmissions to the children, Xt+1, or for making investments 
in the children’s human capital, ht+1. Children’s income is determined by the amount of 
human capital they have, which is determined by the investments the parents do in their 
human capital, ht+1, the endowments they inherit from their parents regardless of the human 
capital investments, et+1, along with government’s spending for investment in human capital, 
Gt+1. Also, the financial transmission, and ut+1, which is capital return due to advantage or 
success in the income market for the children, determine the children’s income. wt+1 is the 
notation for human capital return  (Becker & Tomes, 1979; Guner, 2015).  
 
Equation 2.2 shows how the children’s income is related to the income of their parents, 
through the parents’ investments in their human capital, but also by the endowments that are 
inherited. Becker and Tomes (1979) are assuming the endowment only to be dependent on the 
parents’ endowments and endowments in the society. Endowments are characteristics 
received from parents or other members of the family, both in genetics, like abilities and race, 
but also from belonging to a specific family, like skills and learning goals. The endowments 
are assumed to be correlated positively with endowments of parents. The human capital 
production function H(∙) are partly dependent on the endowments, which means that the 
abilities transmitted from parents to children are a part of the productive in children’s human 
capital development. Moreover, a higher parental income gives a higher amount to be used to 
human capital investments, and a higher portion invested in the children’s human capital will 
make a positive difference in their income. This relation illustrates the relationship between 
the incomes of parents and children and is the fundamental of intergenerational mobility 
(Becker & Tomes, 1979; Guner, 2015).  
 
The degree of intergenerational mobility depends on all the mentioned relations. The 
children’s earnings depend on, besides financial transfers from parents and market luck, the 
return to human capital invested in them. This return is higher if the investments in children’s 
human capital are also higher, and if the transmission of endowments from parents’ 
generation to children are more robust. Parents’ human capital investments are partly decided 
by parental income. Therefore, the amount invested in human capital is determined by how 
much their parents want to invest. Parents having higher incomes also have the opportunity to 
invest more in their children’s human capital, which, in turn, will affect the children’s 
earnings positively (Becker & Tomes, 1979).  
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Black and Devereux (2011) state that parental education return and family income are factors 
that affect their children’s choice of education. The fact that parents being higher educated 
tend to have children also choosing higher educations is a direct effect of having higher 
educated parents, like the relation between parents’ and children’s income. The indirect effect 
applies to the transmitted endowments or abilities from parents to children. As the theoretical 
model on intergenerational mobility by Becker and Tomes (1979) stated, are the children’s 
abilities related to their parents’ abilities. Abilities have a role in the return of human capital. 
Higher abilities lead to a higher return, and a higher return to human capital increases the 
possibility of choosing higher education (Black & Devereux, 2011).  
 
Family income is also mentioned by Black and Devereux (2011) as a factor that influences 
the educational choice. Parents having higher incomes due to higher education may affect the 
children’s educational attainment. This aspect is highly related to one of the hypotheses stated 
in this thesis, that children with parents having higher incomes have a higher tendency of 
choosing the same education as their parents and that this tendency is higher for educations of 
high prestige. Therefore, the perspective on whether children’s educational choice is affected 
by their parents’ income is especially important for my thesis. Children from higher-income 
families have some advantages. As the theoretical model showed, one advantage is that the 
parents can invest more in human capital. These investments may lead to situations where the 
children learn needed skills in a more unchallenging way, which will be advantageous due to 
increased efficiency and possibilities. These are factors that may increase the educational 
attainment for the children (Corak, 2013). Also, parents may have more incentive to make 
investments in their children’s human capital if these investments give a greater return, like 
higher education, who often gives higher incomes and higher possibilities in the labor market 
(Solon, 2004).  
 
The model by Becker and Tomes (1979) does not separate the children’s and parents’ gender, 
which is an essential approach in my thesis. Schneebaum et al. (2014) summarize two 
theoretical frameworks that explain why parents and children make different educational 
choices dependent on gender. The first framework includes the household model, based on 
the theory by Becker and Tomes (1979), whom Gang and Zimmermann (2000) extend to 
separate the mothers’ and fathers’ parts of the transmission of human capital to the children. 
The model by Becker and Tomes (1979) shows that the parents’ investments in children’s 
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human capital are affecting the educational attainment for the children and, after that, their 
income. Gang and Zimmermann (2000) assume that the father has full-time work while the 
mother spends her time both at work and at home. Hence, the father’s income is only 
affecting the children’s education through human capital investments related to earned 
incomes. Mothers, who spend more time with children’s education at home, will influence 
their children’s education through income and by educating the children by spending more 
time with them. An increase in the mother’s educational attainment will decrease the time she 
uses on the children at home. Hence, her alternative costs of home education will increase. 
The predictions state that the total effect of father’s education, therefore, is higher than the 
mothers. The father’s education is affecting the children’s educational achievements more 
positively compared to the mother’s education due to the increased alternative costs of 
spending less time home (Gang & Zimmermann, 2000; Schneebaum et al., 2014) 
 
Even though the household production model is separating how the parents’ gender affects 
children’s educational attainment, it is, however, missing the aspect of whether the children 
are females or males. The second framework presented by Schneebaum et al. (2014) includes 
the aspects of children’s gender, linked to educational attainments. The framework focuses on 
parents as role models and family socialization. The background for this theory is the 
transferred qualities and manners between generations, which can be related to what Becker 
and Tomes (1979) referred to as inherited endowments. These transferred characteristics 
could be gender-typical, leading to manners being transmitted between children and parents 
having the same gender. How the parents appreciate educational attainment is one of these 
transmitted characteristics, which lead to higher-educated fathers having a greater educational 
influence on sons than daughters. Similarly, higher-educated mothers will influence their 
daughters more than their sons according to educational attainment (Schneebaum et al., 
2014).  
 
A summarization of the two frameworks explaining why parents’ and children’s educational 
attainments between generations may depend on genders, shows that the model concerning 
household production claims that both daughters and sons are more educational influenced by 
their father. The role-model theory states, however, that fathers influence their sons more, and 
mothers influence their daughters more (Schneebaum et al., 2014). It is important to clarify 
that these predictions apply for the educational length while my thesis is focusing on the 
different educational fields in higher education. However, one can imagine these theoretical 
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predictions to apply at least as well to the field of education as to the length of education. The 
interest of specific educational fields can just as well be transferred and inherited between 
generations as the length of education can. Mothers and fathers might also influence their 
children differently toward specific educational fields. The parent who spends more time with 
the children can influence them in one way, while the parent earning higher incomes might 
influence in another way, and then lead them toward certain fields. It is interesting to see if 
these theoretical predictions also apply to the influence of educational fields, which will be 
addressed in this thesis.   
 
2.2 Empirical literature review 
Several studies have already been done concerning intergenerational mobility in education, 
with the main focus being whether education length transmits from parents to children (Black 
et al., 2005; Hertz et al., 2007). Hertz et al. (2007) investigated in their paper how educational 
attainment transferred between generations in a fifty-year perspective, 42 countries included. 
They used the regression coefficient from the regression of children’s education against their 
parents, but also the correlation coefficient between the generations to measure educational 
persistence. The data was separated into five-year cohorts for comparison over the fifty years 
measured. The results showed that the Nordic countries had the lowest average correlation 
between parental and children’s education with 0.34. Norway had a correlation coefficient of 
0.35. In comparison, the other countries belonging to western Europe and the USA and the 
Eastern Bloc measured a correlation of 0.41.  
 
Black et al. (2005) also investigated the transmission of educational length between 
generations. Unlike Hertz et al. (2007), they focused on the relation between the different 
gender-pairs of parents and children. Their research is focusing on causal effects between 
parents’ and children’s education length connected with the compulsory school reform in 
Norway, who increased the years of mandatory school from seven to nine years. They ran an 
OLS on children’s years of education against the parents’ years of education, but also a Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with the first stage being the relationship between parents’ years 
of schooling against if they were affected by the reform or not with reform being the 
instrumental variable. The results showed that an extra year of parental education increased 
the years of education for the children. This result was independent of whether the mother 
was measured against her daughter or son. The same applied to the father against his daughter 
or son. A one-year increase in parents’ education showed an increase in children’s education 
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by 0.2 to 0.25 years. The 2SLS estimates showed only one significant causal connection 
between mother’s education and son’s education, and none between the other parent-child 
pairs.  
 
Since the intergenerational mobility in education length is a well-researched area, it is a 
natural extension to investigate the specific education fields in higher education, and if the 
fields are affecting children’s choice of the educational field instead. Since this educational 
influence is the focus of my thesis, it is natural to get an overview of previous papers 
investigating this field. Sociologists have already shown interest in this, but few papers are 
investigating this by the use of economics theory. This lack of papers shows the importance 
and relevance to such an investigation this thesis will address.  
 
One study concerning the choice of education fields between gender is a study done by the 
sociologist Dryler (1998). It is a study investigating students’ choice of educational programs 
at the upper secondary school in Sweden. The focus is to investigate the parents’ influence on 
their children’s determination of educational path. More precisely, if the parents’ field of 
education or their occupational sector affects their children to make educational choices 
related to their parents’ choices.  The paper is both investigating if the children are influenced 
to choose an educational field in the same area as their parents’ educational- and occupational 
field, but also if the parental influence is present when it comes to gender-atypical programs 
as well. To clarify what is defining gender-atypical programs and gender-typical programs, 
Dryler (1998) collected the applicants’ first choice for every fourth comprehensive school for 
those who graduated between 1988-1992. For these pupils, the engineering program had 79% 
of applicants being boys and 21% being girls. Humanities and social science had, 
respectively, 88% and 71% of applicants being girls. Based on this, engineering was classified 
as a field for boys typically, and humanities and social science, a typical educational field for 
girls (Dryler, 1998).  
 
To explain the educational choices based on gender-typical socialization, Dryler (1998) uses 
two of the most dominant sociological theories to describe such socialization, the social 
learning theory, and the cognitive-development theory. According to Dryler (1998), the social 
learning theory says that children choose to follow parents’ gender-specified manners because 
they are being encouraged and supported to do that. The cognitive-development theory says 
that the children decide themselves which parent to follow, and mostly, that would be the 
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parent of the same gender. However, the most prominent parent can influence children of the 
opposite gender to follow them instead (Dryler, 1998). These sociological theories can be 
related to the theory by Becker and Tomes (1979). Which parent the child chooses to follow 
can both be the parent who influences the child by spending more time at home or the parent 
who has higher earnings. Also, parents’ encouragement can be related to the transmitted 
endowments, that, for instance, could be goals or expectations parents have to their children.  
 
For academic programs, Dryler (1998) used four dependent variables, being the two gender-
typical educational fields, engineering for boys, and humanities/social science for girls, and 
the two gender-atypical fields, engineering for girls and humanities/social science for boys. 
The independent variables were the parents’ educational fields and occupational sectors. The 
results showed that, with a few exceptions, a positive relationship between children’s 
educational choice and their parents’ educational and occupational sector, no matter if the 
educational fields were gender-typical or not. One exception worth mention is that mother 
having a technical education or occupation did not seem to affect the son’s choice concerning 
engineering education at the same level as the father. Dryler (1998) also investigated if the 
parents’ effect were more substantial between mother and daughters, and fathers and sons. 
The results showed that boys are more affected by their father’s educational field or 
occupational sector than by their mothers. This result was true both for engineering and 
humanities/social science. However, daughters showed no pattern in the chosen fields 
dependent on parents’ gender. The results showed a weak same-gender effect since only sons 
were affected by the parents’ gender, which suggests that the cognitive-developmental theory 
is not satisfactory enough to explain why sons and daughters choose as they do, compared to 
parents of the same gender. However, the parents’ encouragement, according to the social 
learning theory, seems to be more present (Dryler, 1998).  
 
Helland (2006) investigates in his paper if children’s choice of educational fields is affected 
by their parents’ social background, using data from Norway containing master’s degree 
students who graduated between 1985 and 1996. He promotes hypotheses stating that the self-
recruitment is higher for the elite educations than the others and that children having parents 
with higher incomes tend to choose the elite educations. Educations like law, engineering, and 
medicine are classified as elite educations. Helland (2006) uses sociological theory by 
Boudon (1974) to explain the differences in educational choices. He is presenting three 
mechanisms to explain these educational differences. The first one concerns how different 
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social groups value different educations. Individuals that belong to families in one class- or 
status group may value educational fields differently. For instance, children having parents 
being doctors or lawyers may value educations like medicine and law higher than other 
studies. The second mechanism is that individuals’ accomplishments may differ between the 
social groups because certain social groups or educations have some cultural similarities. It is 
built on the assumption that children have a higher knowledge of their parents’ field of 
education than other fields. The last mechanism describes that individuals want to choose an 
education where their social scale position is at least as high as their parents’ position. This is 
highly related to situations where children choose elite educations as a result of that their 
parents also have an elite education (Helland, 2006).  
 
The dependent variables are the different education fields the children could choose between. 
Based on this, the multinomial logistic regression was the preferred model to use. One of the 
independent variables is the parents’ educations, where the parent who has the highest 
education is used. The father’s education is used if both parents have an education at the same 
level. Helland (2006) justifies this by assuming that the father’s education is having a higher 
impact on the children’s choice of education, due to greater importance on the belonging to a 
specific status group. This assumption is justified by the number of fathers being far higher 
than mothers in the used dataset. To the cases where the mother has the highest education, a 
dummy variable is created to take into account that specific situation. Other independent 
variables included are the parents’ income and social class. Here, fathers’ occupation is used 
as social background, and for incomes, the one between father and mother having the highest 
income is used.  
 
To get some interpretable results, Helland (2006) estimated the probabilities of choosing 
specific educations dependent on the parents’ educations. These probabilities were restricted 
to only apply for male students who completed their education in 1991, lived in central 
municipalities, and having parents with incomes equal to the median. The highest 
probabilities for each possible chosen education belonged to children choosing the same 
education as their parents (male students compared with father’s education mostly). 
Moreover, children choosing similar education as their parents, where parents were elite 
educated, had the highest tendency of choosing the same educational path. The probability of 
children (males) with engineering parents, also chose an engineering education was estimated 
to 0.6, while the probabilities for law education and business administration were estimated 
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to, respectively, 0.4 and 0.22. As a comparison, social science, and humanities and theology 
had estimated probabilities of 0.15 and 0.14. Helland (2006) relates some of the estimates to 
the third mechanism that children choose an education only to achieve at least the same 
position as their parents. However, this mechanism does not explain why children with 
engineering parents tend to choose an engineering education with a probability as high as 0.6. 
If the only purpose was to achieve the same social position, the children could have chosen 
educations in medicine and law since they are also classified as elite educations. According to 
Helland (2006), it is then reasonable to also relate the results to the mechanisms according to 
how different social classes value education fields differently and to cultural similarities 
making it more reasonable to choose education similar to the parents. 
 
Both Helland (2006) and Dryler (1998) are investigating interesting aspects of educational 
field decisions, where the main focus in both articles has concerned the impact of children’s 
educational choices based on their parents’ education. However, they have both omitted 
aspects of interest. Helland (2006) limited his variables not to include both of the parents. The 
education variable and the income variable contained that parent having the highest education 
level or the highest incomes, which gives restricted information about how both the mother 
and father are affecting their children’s choice of education, and also how mother and father 
may affect daughters and sons differently. Dryler (1998) did separate the education variable 
into both mother’s education and father’s education, and these results did say something about 
the impact on daughters and sons from the mothers and fathers, though only for two 
educational paths. One aspect missing in both the papers is how the parental income, both 
mother’s and father’s, separately affects the parental influence on their daughters’ and sons’ 
educational choices. This aspect is relevant for investigating educational influences by 
parents, and the lack of papers makes it an even more important investigation. In this thesis, I 
want to contribute to highlight the importance of doing more research concerning the 
children’s choice of educational path, by the influence of the income of both parents. By 
including incomes, one could show if mothers or fathers get more influential dependent on 
higher incomes, and in which direction this influence goes. Unlike Dryler (1998) and Helland 
(2006), who used sociological theory the explain the different educational choices, this thesis 
will be based on the intergenerational mobility model by Becker and Tomes (1979) to 




This thesis' analysis uses Norwegian register data from Statistics Norway (SSB). These 
register data are available through microdata.no, an analytics tool launched in 2018. 
Microdata.no is a service established between SSB and Norwegian Centre for Research Data 
(NSD) to make the use of register data in research less complicated. All the different variables 
contained in the register data are included in the analytics tool, which makes it possible to 
analyze register data immediately through microdata.no. By May 2020, microdata.no has 
about 200 different variables, including information about education, income, employment, 
demographics, and other population characteristics like gender, family size, and immigration. 
By the use of microdata.no, it is possible to use data that is not anonymized. However, 
confidentiality is secured by several measures that only give anonymous outputs, which 
makes it impossible to identify individuals. For instance, it is not possible to make 
populations with fewer than 1000 individuals for further estimations. Noise added to 
descriptive tables (+/- 5) is another measure to secure confidentiality. Hence, summations of 
table cells will deviate from the population size. One limitation by using microdata.no for 
analyses is that the choice of statistical models is restricted by the models available by 
microdata.no. Also, it is not possible to use other statistical programs on the data, or connect 
own data to microdata.no (Ballo, 2019; NSD & SSB, 2018).  
 
3.1 Dataset and variables 
This thesis aims to investigate whether children’s choice of educational field is affected by 
their parents´ education for master’s degree educations. The children included are those born 
from 1980 to 1992, the millennial generation. Children excluded from the dataset are those 
who not lived in Norway or had an unspecified address at the age of 16. A further restriction 
is that the children must have at least one parent with a completed master’s degree before the 
child was 16 years old. For those situations where only one parent has completed a master’s 
degree, the other parent must have completed a bachelor’s degree. The children with parents 
having a completed bachelor’s degree or lower at the children’s age of 16 are excluded from 
the dataset. Limiting the other parent to at least having a bachelor’s degree is only to include 
families where education is essential for the family. However, the children’s educational 
choices being analyzed are for master’s degree levels only. Also, postgraduate educations are 
excluded. These restrictions give a total of 18635 children. 
 
 14 
3.1.1 Education by prestige levels 
 
The educations in microdata.no are classified by The Norwegian Standard Classification of 
Education (NUS2000), which is the standard education classification used by Statistics 
Norway. NUS2000 is a code system of 6 digits, with each digit varying from 0 to 9, which 
classifies all levels and fields of education in Norway. The first digit classifies the educational 
level, where, for instance, 1 defines primary education, 2 lower secondary education, etc. 7 
defines master’s levels, or first stage of tertiary education, graduate level. The second digit 
classifies educations in a broad aspect. For the tertiary educations, the educations are 
separated in nine different fields: general subjects (70), humanities and arts (71), teacher 
training and pedagogy (72), social science and law (73), business and administration (74), 
natural science (75), health, welfare, and sports (76), primary industries (77), transports, 
safety and security (78) and unspecified fields (79). The third digit is narrowing each field 
even further. For instance, the category containing health education (76) is separated into 
nursing, social services, medicine, dental health, therapy, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, 
sport and physical education, and others (SSB, 2020). The educations chosen in this thesis 
comprises those categorized by the third digit by NUS2000 (see appendix for the complete 
third digit categorization by NUS2000).  
 
For the analysis in this thesis, the educations are separated into three levels of prestige, from 
high prestige to low prestige. The different prestige levels are defined by considering which 
educations give the highest incomes, but also which educations normally are the most popular 
studies among students, by having the most applicants or having high admission 
requirements. The education fields for each prestige level are separated into educations 
belonging to Social sciences and law, and Business & administration (73 and 74), Natural 
sciences (75), and Health (76). The educations classified having the highest prestige are 
business and administration and law, natural science/engineering (in the fields of physics and 
chemistry, geology, and electronic and mechanical), and medicine. These educations follow 
to what Helland (2006) refers to as elite educations in his research concerning educational 
choices. The middle prestige educations are psychology and economics, engineering (in the 
fields of information and computer technology, and building and construction), and 
odontology and pharmacy. The remaining educations are categorized as low prestige. See 
table 1 for a detailed categorization. Educations classified by the same letter are seen as 
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similar educations. Hence, law and business & administration are classified as the same 
education.  
 
Table 1: Categorization of prestige levels. The 2nd digit classification (NUS2000) in 
parenthesis.  
Prestige levels              Educations 
High prestige a. Law, and Business & administration (73 
and 74) 
b. Natural science/engineering - physics and 
chemistry, geology, and electronic and 
mechanical (75) 
c. Medicine (76) 
 
Middle prestige d. Psychology and Economics (73 and 74) 
e. Natural Science/Engineering- information 
and computer technology, and building and 
construction (75) 
f. Odontology and Pharmacy (76) 
 
Low prestige g. Social science, law and Business & 
administration, remaining (73 and 74) 
h. Natural science, remaining (75) 
i. Health, remaining (76) 
j. The remaining uncategorized master’s 
educations 




The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether parents’ education influences their 
children’s choice of education. The dependent variable comprises three choice alternatives, 
whether if the children choose a similar education as one of the parents or if they choose a 
different education than both parents. These outcomes depend on different explanatory 
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variables, which are mothers’ and fathers’ hourly wages and their weekly hours spent at work. 
See the table 2 for further descriptions. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptions of the variables 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable  
 
The child’s choice of 
education 
 
0 if the child chose an education that is different from both 
mother’s and father’s education 
 
1 if the child chose an education equal to the father’s education. 
 
2 if the child chose an education equal to the mother’s 
education. 
 
Explanatory variables  
 
Hourly wage, fathers The fathers’ average income from 2001 to 2012 on the average 
working hours from 2001 to 2012 
 
Hourly wage, mothers The mothers’ average income from 2001 to 2012 on the 
average working hours from 2001 to 2012 
 
Weekly working hours, 
fathers 
The average working hours per week from 2001 to 2012 for 
fathers 
 
Weekly working hours, 
mothers 
The average working hours per week from 2001 to 2012 for 
mothers 
 
Centrality Centrality index for each municipality varying from 0 to 1000. 
1000 is the most central municipality. The index is developed 
by Statistics Norway (SSB, 2017). 
 
Proportion higher 
educated in each 
municipality 
The share of individuals that have completed a higher 
education for each municipality in 2012 
 
 
According to Becker and Tomes (1979) and Black and Devereux (2011), investments in 
children’s human capital are positively affecting the children’s educational attainment. The 
amount of these investments depends on parents’ income. The parent’s incomes could have 
been appropriate explanatory variables. However, the incomes are often correlated with hours 
of work. Gang and Zimmermann (2000) assume that mothers often spend more time home 
with their children instead of working and that fathers work full time. Since earnings probably 
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are correlated with working hours, mothers would have a lower income compared to fathers. 
According to the theory, mothers would probably invest less in children’s human capital, 
which would directly give smaller educational influence than fathers. By this reasoning, the 
parents’ total income will not be an explanatory variable. Hourly wages are chosen as the 
explanatory variable describing the earnings, by separating the total income and working 
hours. A mother who works part-time might still have a high hourly wage even though the 
yearly income has decreased. Using the hourly wage makes it possible to investigate if higher 
parental earnings are an important factor for children’s choice of education. A higher wage 
gives higher incomes depending on hours working. Furthermore, the hours the mothers and 
fathers are spending at work are also an explanatory variable. Using these variables makes it 
possible to separate the effects of hourly wages and hours of work. One of the hypothesis 
states that children are more affected by the parents having the same gender. A dummy 
variable for the children’s gender is interacted with the hourly wage variable and the variable 
for home hours for mothers and fathers, separately, to test this hypothesis. 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) are assuming the inherited endowment are also dependent on the 
endowments in the society, and not only those transmitted from parents. I control for this by 
including an index variable of each municipality's centrality and a variable containing the 
share of higher educated in each municipality. Children who live in more central towns or 
districts, and children who live in municipalities having a higher share of higher educated 
might have a higher possibility of getting information about educations from other than only 
their parents.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The main dataset includes 18635 children. Descriptive statistics on the variables are presented 










Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the variables 
Statistic Mean St. Dev Min  Max 
Gender (women = 0, men = 1) 0.47 0.49 0 1 
Weekly hours at work (fathers) 34.92 4.25 18.75 40 
Weekly hours at work (mothers) 31.46 5.45 15.96 38.71 
Hourly wage (fathers) 382.7 140.02 176.96 873.18 
Hourly wage (mothers) 274.95 88.08 160.12 645.98 
Centrality 862.37 115.17 544 1000 
Proportion higher educated 
High prestige 
0.37 0.10 0.18 0.51 
 
Gender (women = 0, men = 1) 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Weekly hours at work (fathers) 34.8 4.37 18.75 40 
Weekly hours at work (mothers) 31.39 5.49 15.96 38.71 
Hourly wage (fathers) 401.39 145.82 177.22 873.18 
Hourly wage (mothers) 280.13 94.28 160.13 645.98 
Centrality 866.87 113.42 544 1000 
Proportion higher educated 0.37 0.10 0.18 0.51 
Middle prestige     
Gender (women = 0, men = 1) 0.495 0.50 0 1 
Weekly hours at work (fathers) 35.22 4.03 20.42 40 
Weekly hours at work (mothers) 31.36 5.56 15.96 38.5 
Hourly wage (fathers) 379.81 130.17 178.92 828.91 
Hourly wage (mothers) 274.82 87.12 160.98 645.98 
Centrality 861.1 114.93 552 1000 
Proportion higher educated 0.36 0.10 0.18 0.51 
Low prestige     
Gender (women = 0, men = 1) 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Weekly hours at work (fathers) 34.93 4.18 18.75 40 
Weekly hours at work (mothers) 31.62 5.31 16.76 38.54 
Hourly wage (fathers) 359.78 132.19 176.96 852.26 
Hourly wage (mothers) 267.58 76.49 163.34 569.31 
Centrality 856.90 117.31 544 1000 
Proportion higher educated 0.36 0.10 0.18 0.51 
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The descriptive statistics show that more women have an education of lower prestige. The 
parent’s hourly wage decreases when the prestige level gets lower, both for fathers and 
mothers. Also, the individuals with a higher prestige education, live in more central 
municipalities.   
 
Table 4 and 5 show the numbers and proportion of children having education for each of the 
prestige levels, and how the children’s choice of alternatives by the dependent variable is 
distributed. The tables show that most of the children have an education of high prestige and 
have an education different from their parents. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of the children’s prestige levels 
Children’s education Individuals Proportion 
High prestige 8895 47.73 % 
Middle prestige 3246 17.42 % 
Low prestige 6504 34.9 % 
 
Table 5: Distribution of children’s choice by the dependent variable 
Children’s choice Individuals Proportion 
Different education 13634 73.16 % 
Same education as father 3465 18.59 % 















The logit and probit model can be used to examine the choice behavior when an individual 
must choose between two alternatives, a binary dependent choice variable. The probit model 
assumes that the probability of choosing one of the two alternatives follows the cumulative 
distribution function of a normal distribution. For the logit model, the probability follows the 
cumulative distribution function for a logistic distribution (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2012; 
Kennedy, 2008). However, when the individuals are facing situations where they have to 
choose between more than two alternatives simultaneously, the multinomial logit model can 
be used, which is an extension of the logit model. Since the estimations for this thesis must be 
done in microdata.no, the multinomial logit is the only alternative available for multiple-
choice alternatives. The multinomial model is used to model nominal outcomes for each 
choice and relate it to certain individual characteristics as explanatory variables (Hill et al., 
2012; Studenmund & Cassidy, 1992). In my analysis, the dependent variable contains three 
different alternatives, making the multinomial logistic regression a valid model to use.  
 
4.1 Multinomial logistic regression 
 
Let K define the number of alternative categories to choose between, j = 0, 1, …, K. In a 
multinomial model, a reference category, also called the base category (b), is chosen as a 
comparison towards the remaining K-1 categories (Studenmund & Cassidy, 1992).  
 
yi is the outcome if individual i choose alternative j, i = 1,…,n. The multinomial logit model, 




7 = β/) + β#)𝑥0 +⋯+ β1)𝑥0 = 𝐱′2𝛃3,						𝑗 ≠ b.  (4.1) 
 
Which is the log-odds that the jth alternative is chosen compared to that the base category (b) 
is chosen. The model is further assuming p explanatory variables, xi. The p-dimensional 
vector, β), contains the parameters that refer to the effects on xi for choosing the jth 
alternative. The multinomial logit system will contain K-1 logit equations for each alternative 
not being the base category.  Pr(𝑦0 = 𝑗	|	x) is the probability that individual i choose 











          (4.2) 
 
From eq (4.2), the log-odds when comparing an outcome with itself, is ln(P(𝑦0 = 𝑏	|	x)/
P(𝑦0 = 𝑏	|	x)) = 0, which gives β/. 	= 	 β#. =	. . . = 	 β1. = 0. The probability for the base 
category is therefore given by: 
 
 𝑃!" = 𝑃(𝑦! = 𝑏|x) 
                       = #$%("'⋯'"$!)
#$%*"'⋯'"$!)'∑ #$%("#$% 𝐱′i𝛃k,
	 
     = -
-'∑ #$%("#$% 𝐱′i𝛃k)
								    (4.3) 
 
Further, the probability of the remaining alternatives is:  
 
 𝑃(𝑦! = 𝑗|x) =
#$%.𝐱′i𝛃j/
-'∑ #$%("#$% 𝐱′i𝛃k)
											j	 ≠ 	b	  (4.4) 
 
(Hill et al., 2012; Long & Freese, 2001) 
 
I want to investigate whether the probability of children’s choice is affected by a change in 
the explanatory variables. Therefore, the marginal effects will be calculated for interpretation. 
The marginal effect shows the change in the probability of choosing one alternative by a 
change in one of the explanatory variables. The average marginal effect (AME) is the average 
on the effects estimated across observations. The AME on the probability that an individual 












6𝑝0@Q𝛃@ − ∑ 𝑝0)𝛃)A)(/ T7            (4.5) 
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If AME > 0, an increase in x increases the probability of choosing one of the alternatives, 
making it more likely to choose the alternative. Similarly, if AME < 0, an increase in x 
































The analysis contains four separate multinomial logit regressions. One for each of the three 
prestige levels and one who is including all educations independent of prestige levels. By 
separating the regressions into prestige levels, it will be possible to investigate any differences 
in the influence of choosing a similar education as the parents, depending on the prestige level 
of the education. The multinomial logit model, equation 4.1, gives the log-odds estimated. 
The log-odds estimates are presented in the appendix. However, when having interaction 
variables in a logit/mlogit regression, the interpretation of the log-odds cannot be used. The z-
statistics do not establish the statistical significance between the interaction coefficients from 
the regression (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). Hence, the average marginal effects are used for 
interpretation. 
 
5.1 Estimation for all educations 
 
The average marginal effects for all educations, independent on prestige levels, are presented 
in table 6:  
 
Table 6: Estimated average marginal effects of children’s educational choice, all educations 
Explanatory variables Different 
education (j=0) 
Same education 
as father (j = 1) 
Same education 
as mother (j = 2) 






































Mother’s time at work (ref. daughter) -0.00446*** -0.00293*** 0.00739*** 
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(0.00134) (0.00113) (0.00088) 


















Number of observations 
Log likelihood 
LR chi2(22) 








Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
The model controls for the centrality of each municipality and the proportion of higher 
educated in each municipality.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the parental influence on children’s educational 
choice. Hence, the average marginal effects for choosing an education equal to the father 
(j=1) or mother (j=2) will be the focus to discuss. The marginal effect shows if the probability 
increases or decreases in choosing an alternative with a change in an explanatory variable. A 
positive marginal effect shows that by a change in the explanatory variable, the individuals 
are more likely to choose the alternative. For a negative average marginal effect, the 
probability decreases by a change in the explanatory variable.  
 
The first hypothesis states that an increase in parents’ income affects the children’s choice of 
choosing a similar education as the parents. The analysis uses the parents’ hourly wage as a 
variable of earning. The marginal effects measure the changes in the probabilities for the 
dependent variable by a change in hourly wage by 10 kroners (this was done to better the 
readability of coefficients). The second column in Table 6 shows that an increase in father’s 
hourly wage increases the probability that both daughters and sons choose a similar education 
as the fathers. The daughters’ marginal effect is 0.00103, while it for sons is 0.00103 + 
0.00273 = 0.00376. By the interaction, the effect for sons is significantly stronger than for 
daughters. The results show that both daughters and sons are more likely to choose the same 
education as their father when his hourly wage increases. The hypothesis is true for fathers’ 
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wage raise. Hence, an increase in wages does influence the children to choose a similar 
education as fathers. An increase in mothers’ hourly wages increases the probability of both 
daughters and sons choosing a similar education as mothers. Like for fathers’ wage raise, the 
effect is significantly stronger for sons than daughters. Moreover, the probability of choosing 
a similar education as one parent if the other parent has increased wage is reduced, which also 
confirms the hypothesis. These marginal effects by a change in fathers’ and mothers’ wages 
show that the results follow the first hypothesis. An increase in parents’ income makes the 
children more likely to choose a similar education.  
 
According to the theory by Schneebaum et al. (2014) and Dryler (1998), girls tend to be more 
influenced by their mothers and sons by their fathers. Hence, the second hypothesis state that 
children are more influenced by the parent having the same gender. The marginal effects of an 
increase in mothers’ and fathers’ hourly wages show that the probability of daughters and 
sons choosing a similar education as the parent increases. However, for both situations, the 
effects are significantly stronger for sons. The result shows that both parents affect their son’s 
choice more than their daughter’s choice. That sons are more influenced than the daughters by 
their fathers follows the theory. However, sons are more affected than the daughters by the 
mothers, which does not confirm the same-gender hypothesis. According to Gang and 
Zimmermann (2000), parents influence the education of children by increased incomes, and 
by being more home, two separate effects. By considering an increase in the hours spent 
home for mothers (the inverse of the mother’s time at work variable), it is decreasing the 
probability of choosing a similar education as the mothers. The theory assumed the opposite 
effect. However, the effects are significantly stronger for sons. Hence, this effect does not 
confirm the same-gender hypothesis either.  
 
Further, the results show that the marginal effects of an increase in mothers’ wages are 
stronger than the marginal effects of an increase in fathers’ wages. An increase in the 
mothers’ wages increases the probability of choosing a similar education more than an 
increase in fathers’ wages do. Hence the mothers have a greater influence on their children 
than the father. This applies to both daughters and sons, but sons have a significantly stronger 
effect. This result neither confirms to the same-gender hypothesis. Moreover, Gang and 
Zimmermann (2000) assume that by an income increase, fathers would have a stronger 
influence on the children’s educational attainment than the mother. The marginal effects 
show, however, an opposite effect than the theory predicted for educational attainment.  
 26 
5.2 Estimation separated into prestige levels 
 
The previous section presented the results for the multinomial logit regression that included 
all educations in the dataset, independent of prestige levels. According to Becker and Tomes 
(1979) and Black and Devereux (2011), higher parental incomes or education give higher 
possibilities for investments in the children’s human capital and higher possibility for 
increased influence. Even if all educations included are educations of a higher level, the 
expected incomes for each education vary. Some educations often give higher incomes than 
others. By the third hypothesis I want to investigate whether the influence is greater for 
educations receiving higher incomes, hence the high prestige educations. The hypothesis 
states that self-recruitment is higher for the educations of higher prestige. Tables 7-9 show the 
average marginal effects of the multinomial logit regression, which are limited to high 
prestige educations, middle prestige educations, and low prestige educations, separately.   
 
Table 7: Estimated average marginal effects of children’s educational choice, high prestige 




as father (j = 1) 
Same education 
as mother (j = 2) 































































Number of observations 3104   
Log likelihood -1947.33   
LR chi2(22) 596.942   
Prob > chi2 1.2685e-113   
Pseudo R2 0.1329   
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
The model controls for the centrality of each municipality and the proportion of higher 
educated in each municipality.  
 
Table 8: Estimated average marginal effects of children’s educational choice, middle prestige 




as father (j = 1) 
Same education 
as mother (j = 2) 


















































Centrality 0.00014 -0.00006 -0.00007 
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(0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00009) 






Number of observations  1205   
Log likelihood -790.066   
LR chi2(22) 125.746   
Prob > chi2 2.43593e-17   
Pseudo R2 0.07371   
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.  
Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
The model controls for the centrality of each municipality and the proportion of higher 
educated in each municipality.  
 
Table 9: Estimated average marginal effects of children’s educational choice, low prestige 




as father (j = 1) 
Same education 
as mother (j = 2) 































































Number of observations  2441   
Log likelihood -1626.39   
LR chi2(22) 254.745   
Prob > chi2 1.25945e-42   
Pseudo R2 0.07262   
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
The model controls for the centrality of each municipality and the proportion of higher 
educated in each municipality.  
 
 
An increase in fathers’ hourly wages gives an increased probability of children choosing a 
similar education for high prestige education. The effect is significantly stronger for the sons.  
However, for the educations classified as lower prestigious educations, an increase in father’s 
wage makes it less likely that the children choose the same education as the father. Like for 
the high-prestige educations, the effects are significantly stronger for sons. By considering an 
increase in mother’s wages, the probability of choosing the same education as the mother 
increases for all prestige levels. Moreover, the effects are stronger for children with a high 
prestige education and weaker by having a low prestige education. Normally, a Wald test 
could test whether the coefficients were differing significantly, but microdata.no has not yet 
included the test in its analytic tool box. Hence, the probability of children choosing the same 
education as their mothers increases more the higher the prestige. The effects are significantly 
stronger for the sons. The marginal effects show that it is more likely to choose an education 
similar to the parents, the higher the prestige. These results confirm the third hypothesis. 
However, an interesting aspect is how the effects of an increase in fathers' wages change from 
being positive to negative when moving from high prestige to lower prestige. An increase in 
father’s wage makes it more likely for children to choose the same education for high 
prestige, while for low prestige, the probability decreases. These marginal effects confirm the 
first hypothesis that an increase in parents’ income makes it more likely that children choose a 
similar education as the parent having the wage rise. An increase in wage increases the 
probability of choosing the same education as the parent, for all prestige levels, except for 
lower prestige, where an increase in fathers’ income reduces the probability. Moreover, an 
increase in fathers’ hours home decreases the probability of choosing a similar education, for 
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both genders in the case of high prestige, while it for low prestige increases the probability of 
choosing the same education. Keep in mind that the hours spent home are the inverse of time 
at work.  
 
Further, the effects of parents spending more time home are significantly stronger for sons 
independent of prestige level and which parent is home. This latter result does not confirm the 



























This master’s thesis has been investigated the parental influence on their children’s choice of 
educational fields for higher education in Norway. Intergenerational mobility in education is 
the base for this research, and several researchers have investigated the intergenerational 
mobility in education lengths. However, the number of individuals that has a master’s degree 
have increased over the past years. An investigation considering the mobility in educational 
fields is an innovative approach for the field of intergenerational mobility. This master’s 
thesis has investigated whether children are more or less likely to choose a similar education 
as their parents by multinomial logistic regression. This section will contain a discussion 
around the presented results, and whether they are following the theory and hypotheses. If the 
results differ from hypotheses and theory, what are the mechanisms that drive such results?  
 
The first hypothesis stated that parents with higher incomes would have a stronger influence 
on their children. The results show that independent on prestige level, an increase in parents’ 
hourly wage increased the probability of children choosing a similar education. The only 
exception was for fathers’ wage increase for low prestige educations. Becker and Tomes 
(1979) and Black and Devereux (2011) explain how children’s income and education are 
dependent on their parents’ income and education. This relation is partly dependent on human 
capital investments by parents. Children often have a higher knowledge of their parents’ 
education, according to Helland (2006). This knowledge is transmitted from parents to 
children, for instance, through discussions or that the parents have a higher possibility of 
helping them with school subjects close to their own education field, which is also a sort of 
human capital investments, that would increase the influence. According to Solon (2004), 
parents have a greater incentive to invest in children’s human capital if the investments give a 
higher return in the form of higher education or incomes. Hence, the transmission of 
knowledge from parents to children might be greater for parents with higher incomes since 
their knowledge might lead to educations achieving higher incomes. These are factors that can 
explain why parents with increased incomes have a stronger influence on their children and 
help to confirm the first hypothesis.  
 
According to Gang and Zimmermann (2000), fathers have a greater influence on children by 
increasing incomes. However, the results show that a wage raise for mothers increased the 
probability of choosing a similar education more than for fathers. Hence, mothers have a 
greater effect on children choosing the same education than the fathers by a wage increase. 
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This result shows the opposite of what theory expected. However, Gang and Zimmermann 
(2000) assume that mothers do not work full time, as the fathers do. The mothers in this 
analysis have completed a master’s degree, and it is likely to assume that these mothers do 
spend more time at work. The limitation on the parents’ working hours might not fit this 
group of mothers, who includes only higher educated mothers. Statistics from Statistic 
Norway show that numbers of mothers in the labor market increased in the last decades, from 
55.1% in 1980 to 67.5 % in 2019. As the proportion of women who participate in the labor 
market has increased, it has approached the proportion of men working in 2019, which were 
73.4%. These statistics show that women participate more in the labor market now than in the 
last decades. Also, the gap between women and men that have completed a master’s degree is 
decreasing every year. In 2018 there were 10.6 % men that had completed education of 4 
years or more and 9.5% women (SSB, 2018). These statistics show that women probably are 
spending more hours at work than previous and that the proportion of women having a higher 
education has increased. These are factors showing that mothers contribute more to the 
household’s income and are more equal to the fathers’ contribution than previously. It is 
probably reasonable to assume that mothers who have a higher education have a stronger 
position and more power in a family. This increased power within the family and the 
increased equality of genders in Norway might be factors explaining why mothers have a 
greater influence on their children’s educational choices by a wage increase than expected 
through the theory.  
 
Sons are more affected by their fathers, and daughters are more affected by their mother, are 
stated by the second hypothesis. The results show that sll the average marginal effects are 
significantly stronger for the sons than the daughters, independent by a change in hourly 
wages or hours spent home. The fact that sons are more likely to follow the father is expected 
by the theory. Sons being more influenced than daughters by their mothers, shows the 
opposite of what theory states.  Helland (2006) describes that children might choose an 
education based on getting a higher or equal position at the social ladder compared to the 
parents, which can be a mechanism affecting the children’s educational choice. On average, 
men have the highest incomes, and previously, the difference between the number of men and 
women having master’s degrees was greater. Sons might wish to achieve a higher social 
position compared to their mother. Hence, when mothers’ wages increase, the desire to 
achieve a higher position increases even more. The results show that the sons are more 
influenced than the daughter. Daughters might be interpreted as less affectable by their 
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parents’ social background, and, therefore, do not have the same desire to achieve a greater 
position than both the parents, compared to the sons’ desire.  
 
The third hypothesis states that parents influence more children with high prestige educations 
than children belonging to other prestige levels. The average marginal effects show that 
children with high prestige educations are more likely to choose a similar education as the 
parents by an increase in parental wages. This result is independent of which parent that has 
an increased wage.  These effects are expected according to the intergenerational mobility 
model by Becker and Tomes (1979) and by Solon (2004), who says that parents are more 
motivated to invest in human capital if it gives higher returns, like higher incomes. If parents 
with high-prestige educations affect their children to choose the same education, the children 
will also have an education of high prestige and probably achieve higher future incomes, 
which is a motivation for the parents’ investments. This reasoning confirms the third 
hypothesis, as well as the first hypothesis.  
 
An interesting result is the decreased probability of choosing similar education as fathers by 
an increase in fathers’ incomes for low prestige educations. By including the results for high 
prestige educations, where fathers’ effects were even greater than mothers’ effects, it is 
reasonable to discuss whether income is more important for fathers than mothers. Gang and 
Zimmermann (2000) are predicting that fathers only affect the children’s education through 
their earned incomes. The result confirms the connection to the theory. Fathers who have 
lower incomes do not manage to influence the children to choose the same education by a 
wage raise, and fathers having the highest incomes increase their educational influence even 
more by increased wages. Income seems to be of less importance for children with educations 
of low prestige. Children choosing educations of low prestige might not be that interested and 
driven by higher status and incomes. According to Becker and Tomes (1979), inherited 
endowments are factors that can affect children’s income and education, in addition to human 
capital investments. For fathers spending more time home, it is more likely that the children 
choose a similar education for low prestige. Hence, it is reasonable to discuss whether 
families with children that chose low prestige educations have other values of what is 
important for them than the families of high prestige. If incomes are of less importance, their 
educational influence will maybe be related to other factors. However, since these results do 
not follow the theory, it might be appropriate to investigate this further in other research.  
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The decreased probability of choosing the same education as fathers for low prestige would 
according to the household production theory, probably be more expected for an increase in 
mothers’ wages instead of for fathers. If mothers increase their work (and income), they 
simultaneously decrease their time at home. An increase in income increases the impact on 
children’s education. However, mothers have an alternative cost for spending less time home 
for the educating, which will lower the influence of an income increase. This means that the 
influence mothers do when spending time home also affects the children’s choice of 
education, according to theory. However, for this analysis, the theory seems to fit better for 
fathers with low prestige educations. Even if the theory states the opposite, mothers seem to 
have a greater influence than the fathers on the children’s educational choice by increased 
wages. Moreover, fathers with educations of low prestige tend to have an opposite impact 
than assumed by the theory. One could discuss whether there have been some changes in 
gender roles, especially for low prestige. The parents included in this analysis, are parents 
having master’s degrees. Hence, they are achieving higher incomes and spending less time 
home, and this also includes mothers. It can be reasonable to discuss whether the used theory 
does not apply to such a group since the preconditions are different from those in theory. 
Another approach is that the gender-equality in Norway has increased over the past decades, 
which might give results that depart from a theory developed several years ago.  
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) and Black and Devereux (2011) are, in addition to the human 
capital investments, describing how the inherited endowments between generations also affect 
the children’s incomes and attained education. The inherited endowments are exemplified by 
being abilities, skills, or other values transmitted from parents to children. These endowments 
can be related to the mechanism Helland (2006) uses to describe how families that belong to 
different status groups value education differently. If one of the parents is a doctor, the 
children probably value educations like medicine more than other educations because those 
values are inherited from their parents. The transmitted endowments are factors that partly 
create values, preferences, and interests the children have for specific education fields and are 
important factors when discussing the choice of educational fields. Through this thesis, the 
focus has been on the impact of parental wages and their hours spent at home. Interests and 
values are more challenging to measure and are not a part of the estimations done in this 
analysis. This approach might be a starting point for further research investigating the parents’ 
educational influence on children’s choice of educational fields.  
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The purpose of this master’s thesis was to investigate whether the parents influenced the 
children’s choice of higher education fields. Sociologists have already shown an interest in 
this field. However, economists have investigated the intergenerational mobility for 
educational lengths, but not for the educational fields. The number of parents with a master’s 
degree has increased in the past years. Hence, research like this is of high relevance by 
considering the development in higher education. The results confirmed two of the 
hypotheses. For the same-gender hypothesis, there were some results partly showing the 
opposite effect. Importance by investigating intergenerational mobility is its effects on the 
inequalities in societies. Continued lower intergenerational mobility will increase inequality. 
This analysis showed that the probability of choosing similar education as parents increased 
most for the high prestige educations. That is, intergenerational mobility is lower for higher 
prestige. If these effects are unchanged or even increases, the gap between the individuals of 
high prestige and the others will increase. This increased gap gives a higher degree of 
inequality between the societies’ prestige groups and the others. An increased inequality gives 
unequal possibilities, and those children who belong to families with a prestigious 
background will probably have some advantages by only being a part of the family and 
having a greater possibility of achieving prestigious educations. Situations like that can 
motivate societies and politicians to pay attention of their degree of mobility in education and 
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Appendix A: Educations categorized by the third digit by NUS2000. Retrieved from Statistics 
Norway https://www.ssb.no/en/klass/klassifikasjoner/36/ 
70 General subjects 71 Humanities and arts 73 Social sciences and law 
701 General subjects 711 Languages 
712 Literature and 
librarianship 
713 History and Philosophy 
714 Religion 
715 Music, dance and drama 
716 Visual art and crafts 
719 Humanities and arts, 
other 
731 Political science 
732 Sociology 
733 Social geography 
734 Economics 
735 Media and information 
736 Psychology 
737 Law 
738 Social anthropology 
739 Social sciences and law, 
other 
74 Business and 
administration 
75 Natural sciences, 
vocational and technical 
subjects 
76 Health, welfare and 
sport 
741 Business and 
administration 
742 Wholesale and retail 
sales and marketing 
743 Secretarial and office 
skills 
744 Hotel, travel and 
tourism 
749 Business and 
administration, other 
751 Biology 
752 Physics and chemistry 
753 Mathematics and 
statistics 
754 Information and 
computer theory 
755 Electrical, electronic, 
mechanical and machine 
subjects 
756 Earth sciences 
757 Building and 
construction 
758 Manufacturing and 
extraction 
761 Nursing and caring 
762 Social services 
763 Medicine 
764 Dental health 
765 Therapy 
766 Pharmacy 
767 Veterinary medicine 
768 Sport and physical 
education 
769 Health, welfare and 
sport, other 
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759 Natural sciences, 
vocational and technical 
subjects, other 
77 Primary industries 78 Transport and 
communications, safety 
and security and other 
services 
79 Unspecified field of 
study 





779 Primary industries, other 
781 Transport and 
communications 
782 Safety and security 
783 Other services 
789 Transport and 
communications, safety and 
security and other services, 
other 






















Appendix B: The log-odds for all regressions. 
For all educations:  
 
Figure 1: Output from microdata.no. Show the log-odds with j=0 (different education) as base 
category. For all educations. 
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For high prestige: 
 
Figure 2: Output from microdata.no. The log-odds with j=0 (different education) as base 
category. For high prestige educations. 
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For middle prestige educations: 
 
Figure 3: Output from microdata.no. Show the log-odds with j=0 (different education) as base 
category. For middle prestige educations. 
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For low prestige educations: 
 
Figure 4: Output from microdata.no. Show the log-odds with j=0 (different education) as base 
category. For low prestige educations. 
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import BEFOLKNING_KJOENN as kjønn 
import BEFOLKNING_FAR_FNR as far_fnr 
import BEFOLKNING_MOR_FNR as mor_fnr 
import BEFOLKNING_FOEDSELS_AAR_MND as birthyear 
import NUDB_KOMM_16 as bosted     // brukes til sentralitet 
import NUDB_KOMM_16 as bosted1     // brukes til andel høyere utdannede i hver 
kommune 
destring bosted, force 
destring bosted1, force 
 
 
// Begrenser til personer født mellom 1980 og 1995: 
 
generate cohort = int(birthyear/100) 
keep if cohort >= 1980 & cohort <= 1992 
tabulate cohort 
 
//// Barna: født mellom 1980-1992 som selv har masterutdanning 
 
import NUDB_BU 2016-08-31 as utd16 
generate utdfelt = substr(utd16, 1, 3) 
tabulate cohort 
destring utdfelt, force 
keep if utdfelt >= 700 & utdfelt < 800     //Begrenser til personer født mellom 1980 og 
1992 som selv har masterutdanning 
recode utdfelt   (737 741 = 1) (752 756 755= 2) (763 = 3) ( 736 734 = 11) (754 757 758 = 12) (766 764 = 13) 
(731/749 = 21) (751/759 = 22) (761/769 = 23) (700/799 = 26)  
 
//High prestige 
// 1 = Business & administration 
// 2 = Enginieer 
// 3 = Medicine 
 
//Middle prestige: 
// 11 = Psychology and Economics 
// 12 = Engineer 
// 13 = Odontology and pharmacy 
 
// Low prestige 
// 21 = Social science, remaining 
// 22 = Nature Science, remaining 
// 23 = Health, remaining 
// 26 = Others 
 






////// Mor og fars utdanning 
import NUDB_NUS2000_FAR_16 as farutd 
import NUDB_NUS2000_MOR_16 as morutd 
 
generate utdfar = substr(farutd, 1, 3) 
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generate utdmor = substr(morutd, 1, 3) 
 
destring utdmor, force 
destring utdfar, force 
 
keep if (utdfar >= 700 & utdfar < 800) | (utdmor >= 700 & utdmor < 800) | (utdfar >= 700 & utdfar < 800) & 
(utdmor >= 700 & utdmor < 800) 
 
recode utdfar ( 737 741 = 1) (752 756 755= 2) (763 = 3) (736 734 = 11) (754 757 758 = 12) (766 764 = 13) 
(731/749 = 21) (751/759 = 22) (761/769 = 23) (700/799 = 26) (600/699 = 31) (0/599 = 32) ( 800/999 = 33) 
 
recode utdmor ( 737 741 = 1) (752 756 755 = 2) (763 = 3) (736 734 = 11) (754 757 758 = 12) (766 764 = 13) 
(731/749 = 21) (751/759 = 22) (761/769 = 23) (700/799 = 26) (600/699 = 31) (0/599 = 32) ( 800/999 = 33) 
 
drop if utdmor == 32 | utdmor == 33 | utdfar == 32 | utdfar == 33    // Beholder tilfellene hvor 
mor/far har master hvor den andre har bachelor 
 
 
// Dummy-variabel gender 
 
generate mann = 0 




///////////// WORKING HOURS  
 
///////////// working hours mothers, weekly, 2001-2012 
 
create-dataset mor_arbtid 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2001-11-01 as arbtim01 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2002-11-01 as arbtim02 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2003-11-01 as arbtim03 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2004-11-01 as arbtim04 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2005-11-01 as arbtim05 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2006-11-01 as arbtim06 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2007-11-01 as arbtim07 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2008-11-01 as arbtim08 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2009-11-01 as arbtim09 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2010-11-01 as arbtim10 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2011-11-01 as arbtim11 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2012-11-01 as arbtim12 
 
merge arbtim01 arbtim02  arbtim03  arbtim04  arbtim05  arbtim06  arbtim07  arbtim08  arbtim09  arbtim10  
arbtim11  arbtim12 into utd on mor_fnr 
 
 




import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2001-11-01 as arbtim01_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2002-11-01 as arbtim02_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2003-11-01 as arbtim03_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2004-11-01 as arbtim04_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2005-11-01 as arbtim05_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2006-11-01 as arbtim06_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2007-11-01 as arbtim07_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2008-11-01 as arbtim08_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2009-11-01 as arbtim09_f 
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import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2010-11-01 as arbtim10_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2011-11-01 as arbtim11_f 
import REGSYS_ARBTIM 2012-11-01 as arbtim12_f 
 
merge arbtim01_f  arbtim02_f  arbtim03_f  arbtim04_f  arbtim05_f  arbtim06_f  arbtim07_f  arbtim08_f  





///////////// Average weekly working hours 
 
 
generate gjarbtimer_mor_uke = ( arbtim01 + arbtim02 + arbtim03 + arbtim04 + arbtim05 + arbtim06 + arbtim07 
+ arbtim08 + arbtim09 + arbtim10 + arbtim11 + arbtim12)/12 
generate gjarbtimer_far_uke = ( arbtim01_f + arbtim02_f + arbtim03_f + arbtim04_f + arbtim05_f + arbtim06_f 










import INNTEKT_WLONN 2001-01-01 as farincome6 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2002-01-01 as farincome7 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2003-01-01 as farincome9 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2004-01-01 as farincome10 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2005-01-01 as farincome11 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2006-01-01 as farincome12 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2007-01-01 as farincome13 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2008-01-01 as farincome14 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2009-01-01 as farincome15 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2010-01-01 as farincome16 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2011-01-01 as farincome17 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2012-01-01 as farincome18 
 
 
merge farincome6 farincome7 farincome9 farincome10 farincome11 farincome12 farincome13 farincome14 
farincome15 farincome16 farincome17 farincome18 into utd on far_fnr 
 
 




import INNTEKT_WLONN 2001-01-01 as morincome6 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2002-01-01 as morincome7 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2003-01-01 as morincome9 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2004-01-01 as morincome10 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2005-01-01 as morincome11 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2006-01-01 as morincome12 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2007-01-01 as morincome13 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2008-01-01 as morincome14 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2009-01-01 as morincome15 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2010-01-01 as morincome16 
import INNTEKT_WLONN 2011-01-01 as morincome17 




merge morincome6 morincome7 morincome9 morincome10 morincome11 morincome12 morincome13 






///////////// Average yearly income 
 
generate meanmor = (morincome6 + morincome7 + morincome9 + morincome10 + morincome11 + 
morincome12 + morincome13 + morincome14 + morincome15 + morincome16 + morincome17 + 
morincome18)/12 
 
generate meanfar = (farincome6 + farincome7 + farincome9 + farincome10 + farincome11 + farincome12 + 
farincome13 + farincome14 + farincome15 + farincome16 + farincome17 + farincome18)/12 
 
 
//////////// Average hourly wage = Average weekly income / Average weekly working hours 
 
 
generate Imeanfar_uke = meanfar/52 
generate timelønnfar_gj = Imeanfar_uke/gjarbtimer_far_uke 
generate timelønnfar_gj10 = timelønnfar_gj/10 
 
generate Imeanmor_uke = meanmor/52 
generate timelønnmor_gj = Imeanmor_uke/gjarbtimer_mor_uke 




/////// higher educated in each municipality 
 
rename bosted1 andel_høyereutd 
 
recode andel_høyereutd ( 101 = 0.260679825 ) ( 104 = 0.285692617 ) ( 105 = 0.226992897 ) ( 106 = 
0.273630222 ) ( 111 = 0.278039832 ) ( 118 = 0.181019332 ) ( 119 = 0.179257787 ) ( 121 = 0.190053286 ) ( 122 
= 0.17672512 ) ( 123 = 0.224843108 ) ( 124 = 0.207000317 ) ( 125 = 0.205015067 ) ( 127 = 0.175562269 ) ( 
128 = 0.17997543 ) ( 135 = 0.240694375 ) ( 136 = 0.258239134 ) ( 137 = 0.231054978 ) ( 138 = 0.237158723 ) 
( 211 = 0.326058557 ) ( 213 = 0.350603686 ) ( 214 = 0.414878778 ) ( 215 = 0.350125549 ) ( 216 = 0.436402016 
) ( 217 = 0.418857062 ) ( 219 = 0.507707339 ) ( 220 = 0.478961599 ) ( 221 = 0.18311488 ) ( 226 = 
0.291536284 ) ( 227 = 0.272172272 ) ( 228 = 0.298316889 ) ( 229 = 0.225297374 ) ( 230 = 0.322540687 ) ( 231 
= 0.301106026 ) ( 233 = 0.33221439 ) ( 234 = 0.292143862 ) ( 235 = 0.2586155 ) ( 236 = 0.20277183 ) ( 237 = 
0.229684601 ) ( 238 = 0.213553 ) ( 239 = 0.193978495 ) ( 301 = 0.484225918 )( 402 = 0.216087482 ) ( 403 = 
0.353930122 ) ( 412 = 0.224212812 ) ( 415 = 0.209409888 ) ( 417 = 0.26426499 ) ( 418 = 0.156503594 ) ( 419 
= 0.179149644 ) ( 420 = 0.153290224 ) ( 423 = 0.174534011 ) ( 425 = 0.173349977 ) ( 426 = 0.177474403 ) ( 
427 = 0.288322866 ) ( 428 = 0.187184116 ) ( 429 = 0.213398163 ) ( 430 = 0.231105286 ) ( 432 = 0.189122373 ) 
( 434 = 0.185983827 ) ( 436 = 0.285927029 ) ( 437 = 0.271662246 ) ( 438 = 0.210307132 ) ( 439 = 0.223891811 
)( 441 = 0.243814122 ) ( 501 = 0.382135956 ) ( 502 = 0.286524309 ) ( 511 = 0.184848485 ) ( 512 = 
0.215302491 ) ( 513 = 0.191341529 ) ( 514 = 0.211195929 ) ( 515 = 0.190413657 ) ( 516 = 0.193387399 ) ( 517 
= 0.180960032 ) ( 519 = 0.195019157 ) ( 520 = 0.185165563 ) ( 521 = 0.234047563 ) ( 522 = 0.201969492 ) ( 
528 = 0.221505203 ) ( 529 = 0.203498489 ) ( 532 = 0.209139488 ) ( 533 = 0.246225638 ) ( 534 = 0.208656158 ) 
( 536 = 0.19023189 ) ( 538 = 0.172181915 ) ( 540 = 0.186320755 ) ( 541 = 0.191082803 ) ( 542 = 0.225245234 
) ( 543 = 0.202785515 ) ( 544 = 0.231716418 ) ( 545 = 0.23149492 ) ( 602 = 0.315552816 ) ( 604 = 0.37183968 
) ( 605 = 0.249314516 ) ( 612 = 0.360874398 ) ( 615 = 0.189636163 ) ( 616 = 0.22058319 ) ( 617 = 
0.219608879 ) ( 618 = 0.278713629 ) ( 619 = 0.244357977 ) ( 620 = 0.240862477 ) ( 621 = 0.163272351 ) ( 622 
= 0.227224576 ) ( 623 = 0.206043471 ) ( 624 = 0.236002449 ) ( 625 = 0.233295872 ) ( 626 = 0.338117163 ) ( 
627 = 0.326786883 ) ( 628 = 0.256103896 ) ( 631 = 0.208140611 ) ( 632 = 0.216329966 ) ( 633 = 0.180243446 ) 
( 701 = 0.299054905 ) ( 704 = 0.352113083 ) ( 711 = 0.214377407 ) ( 709 = 0.22529081 ) ( 713 = 0.243331077 
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) ( 715 714 702 = 0.247969656  ) ( 716 = 0.230841751 ) ( 706 = 0.2443115867 ) ( 728 722 = 0.327072761 ) ( 
805 = 0.26918528  ) ( 806 = 0.264956685 ) ( 807 = 0.249333587 ) ( 811 = 0.222631579 ) ( 814 = 0.225992593 ) 
( 815 = 0.230777865 ) ( 817 = 0.166715414 ) ( 819 = 0.216250917 ) ( 821 = 0.332251521 ) ( 822 = 0.255484588 
) ( 826 = 0.197225573 ) ( 827 = 0.191585274 ) ( 828 = 0.247758761 ) ( 829 = 0.246411483 ) ( 830 = 
0.228379513 ) ( 831 = 0.246039143 ) ( 833 = 0.225321888 ) ( 834 = 0.260770235 ) ( 901 = 0.247062889 ) ( 904 
= 0.322643723 ) ( 906 = 0.292364525 ) ( 911 = 0.152436083 ) ( 912 = 0.231389578 ) ( 914 = 0.241351406 ) ( 
919 = 0.193732845 ) ( 926 = 0.311228154 ) ( 928 = 0.22456765 ) ( 929 = 0.208058124 ) ( 935 = 0.147286822 ) 
( 937 = 0.215893108 ) ( 938 = 0.26001955 ) ( 940 = 0.238049713 ) ( 941 = 0.295719844 ) ( 1001 = 0.348617657 
) ( 1002 = 0.27597559 ) ( 1003 = 0.21152863 ) ( 1004 = 0.237255965 ) ( 1014 = 0.188462219 ) ( 1017 = 
0.204373757 ) ( 1018 = 0.277441077 ) ( 1021 = 0.182421227 ) ( 1026 = 0.172972973 ) ( 1027 = 0.221893491 ) 
( 1029 = 0.206182933 ) ( 1032 = 0.222530009 ) ( 1034 = 0.191679049 ) ( 1037 = 0.179803471 ) ( 1046 = 
0.236878453 ) ( 1101 = 0.218424589 ) ( 1102 = 0.324973374 ) ( 1103 = 0.417272787 ) ( 1106 = 0.315775428 ) 
( 1111 = 0.166730402 ) ( 1112 = 0.187257187 ) ( 1114 = 0.204271123 ) ( 1119 = 0.207377165 ) ( 1120 = 
0.227153687 ) ( 1121 = 0.28843471 ) ( 1122 = 0.236613119 ) ( 1124 = 0.348103142 ) ( 1127 = 0.289247312 ) ( 
1129 = 0.210359408 ) ( 1130 = 0.225382706 ) ( 1133 = 0.243230626 ) ( 1134 = 0.240116656 ) ( 1135 = 
0.207439938 ) ( 1141 = 0.252760252 ) ( 1142 = 0.26272578 ) ( 1144 = 0.201923077 ) ( 1145 = 0.165229885 ) ( 
1146 = 0.229920882 ) ( 1149 = 0.219078513 ) ( 1151 = 0.298780488 ) ( 1154 1160 = 0.215770609 ) ( 1201 = 
0.399614969 ) ( 1211 = 0.22537359 ) ( 1216 = 0.234287054 ) ( 1219 = 0.220501636 ) ( 1221 = 0.29418526 ) ( 
1222 = 0.215798046 ) ( 1223 = 0.213554987 ) ( 1224 = 0.221201612 ) ( 1227 = 0.236899563 ) ( 1228 = 
0.22674219 ) ( 1231 = 0.244555516 ) ( 1232 = 0.24168798 ) ( 1233 = 0.27795874 ) ( 1234 = 0.237789203 ) ( 
1235 = 0.275693731 ) ( 1238 = 0.253247701 ) ( 1241 = 0.225647753 ) ( 1242 = 0.211111111 ) ( 1243 = 
0.288504834 ) ( 1244 = 0.227480916 ) ( 1245 = 0.196495855 ) ( 1246 = 0.255560765 ) ( 1247 = 0.274299261 ) 
( 1251 = 0.196242171 ) ( 1252 = 0.242524917 ) ( 1253 = 0.19220366 ) ( 1256 = 0.26697139 ) ( 1259 = 
0.176549145 ) ( 1260 = 0.185239852 ) ( 1263 = 0.239369562 ) ( 1264 = 0.186631944 ) ( 1265 = 0.218340611 ) 
( 1266 = 0.176554682 ) ( 1401 = 0.2461328 ) ( 1411 = 0.215856777 ) ( 1412 = 0.196969697 ) ( 1413 = 
0.195945946 ) ( 1416 = 0.206436648 ) ( 1417 = 0.218623482 ) ( 1418 = 0.310155535 ) ( 1419 = 0.405257393 ) 
( 1420 = 0.363235062 ) ( 1421 = 0.260255548 ) ( 1422 = 0.267660044 ) ( 1424 = 0.205485512 ) ( 1426 = 
0.262097765 ) ( 1428 = 0.21672698 ) ( 1429 = 0.253610875 ) ( 1430 = 0.258078414 ) ( 1431 = 0.262541806 ) ( 
1432 = 0.351866561 ) ( 1433 = 0.234743875 ) ( 1438 = 0.183853674 ) ( 1439 = 0.218066626 ) ( 1441 = 
0.181034483 ) ( 1443 = 0.274432173 ) ( 1444 = 0.238193018 ) ( 1445 = 0.293736501 ) ( 1449 = 0.241488241 ) 
( 1502 = 0.355988093 ) ( 1504 = 0.333078525 ) ( 1505 1503 = 0.254770423 ) ( 1511 = 0.170327692 ) ( 1514 = 
0.201468564 ) ( 1515 = 0.208056478 ) ( 1516 = 0.304499318 ) ( 1517 = 0.22291767 ) ( 1519 = 0.367485412 ) ( 
1520 = 0.250878015 ) ( 1523 = 0.294086308 ) ( 1524 = 0.2172949 ) ( 1525 = 0.213089005 ) ( 1526 = 
0.218404908 ) ( 1528 = 0.229696871 ) ( 1529 = 0.257520382 ) ( 1531 = 0.26006687 ) ( 1532 = 0.2634798 ) ( 
1534 = 0.216958277 ) ( 1535 = 0.198542805 ) ( 1539 = 0.212571429 ) ( 1543 = 0.1670004 ) ( 1545 = 
0.197929354 ) ( 1546 = 0.1875 ) ( 1547 = 0.242841609 ) ( 1548 = 0.194718626 ) ( 1551 = 0.198826119 ) ( 1554 
= 0.214755141 ) ( 1557 = 0.219302437 ) ( 1560 = 0.23453909 ) ( 1563 = 0.218011068 ) ( 1566 = 0.201650231 ) 
( 1567 = 0.18044659 ) ( 1571 = 0.190661479 ) ( 1573 = 0.179444444 ) ( 1576 = 0.196682464 ) ( 1601 = 
0.419495208 ) ( 1702 = 0.264071215 ) ( 1703 = 0.276377575 ) ( 1612 = 0.172296338 ) ( 1613 = 0.151883354 ) 
( 1617 = 0.193906532 ) ( 1620 = 0.207696228 ) ( 1621 = 0.208527493 ) ( 1622 = 0.171097478 ) ( 1627 = 
0.192705639 ) ( 1630 = 0.175720015 ) ( 1632 = 0.147521161 ) ( 1633 = 0.169902913 ) ( 1634 = 0.229385574 ) 
( 1635 = 0.17236534 ) ( 1636 = 0.171129578 ) ( 1638 = 0.222387268 ) ( 1640 = 0.260184796 ) ( 1644 = 
0.187903699 ) ( 1648 = 0.181275284 ) ( 1653 = 0.232620532 ) ( 1657 = 0.270265696 ) ( 1662 = 0.243184768 ) 
( 1663 = 0.3354531 ) ( 1664 = 0.212418301 ) ( 1665 = 0.196452933 )( 1624 = 0.200964034 )  ( 1718 = 
0.212376934 )( 1711 = 0.186915888 ) ( 1714 = 0.265131401 ) ( 1717 = 0.189265537 ) ( 1719 = 0.329799391 ) ( 
1721 = 0.218410805 ) ( 1724 = 0.165652784 ) ( 1725 = 0.1875 ) ( 1736 = 0.245495495 ) ( 1738 = 0.204347826 ) 
( 1739 = 0.203084833 ) ( 1740 = 0.151147099 ) ( 1742 = 0.22131541 ) ( 1743 = 0.257142857 ) ( 1744 = 
0.245478902 ) ( 1748 = 0.188191882 ) ( 1749 = 0.23255814 ) ( 1750 = 0.178479197 ) ( 1751 = 0.177964072 ) ( 
1755 = 0.160493827 ) ( 1756 = 0.280766396 ) ( 1804 = 0.34310463 ) ( 1805 = 0.282166176 ) ( 1811 = 
0.173139159 ) ( 1812 = 0.2013261 ) ( 1813 = 0.226388453 ) ( 1815 = 0.199807877 ) ( 1816 = 0.19047619 ) ( 
1818 = 0.160603981 ) ( 1820 = 0.260209082 ) ( 1822 = 0.218819599 ) ( 1824 = 0.22849946 ) ( 1825 = 
0.159034138 ) ( 1826 = 0.178542834 ) ( 1827 = 0.202772964 ) ( 1828 = 0.285620915 ) ( 1832 = 0.179015684 ) 
( 1833 = 0.238017302 ) ( 1834 = 0.179746835 ) ( 1835 = 0.190981432 ) ( 1836 = 0.162882527 ) ( 1837 = 
0.178564666 ) ( 1838 = 0.220329025 ) ( 1839 = 0.117908788 ) ( 1840 = 0.220528455 ) ( 1841 = 0.223483903 ) 
( 1845 = 0.166257669 ) ( 1848 = 0.189591078 ) ( 1849 = 0.257124352 ) ( 1850 = 0.185671642 ) ( 1851 = 
0.210211841 ) ( 1852 = 0.180147059 ) ( 1853 = 0.197584124 ) ( 1854 = 0.164545026 ) ( 1856 = 0.136363636 ) 
( 1857 = 0.14084507 ) ( 1859 = 0.165644172 ) ( 1860 = 0.224040694 ) ( 1865 = 0.235930172 ) ( 1866 = 
0.243562874 ) ( 1867 = 0.160510114 ) ( 1868 = 0.18064862 ) ( 1870 = 0.23944687 ) ( 1871 = 0.191176471 ) ( 
1874 = 0.161812298 ) ( 1902 = 0.398329299 ) ( 1903 = 0.302323282 ) ( 1911 = 0.233160622 ) ( 1913 = 
0.230496454 ) ( 1917 = 0.172272354 ) ( 1919 = 0.199790795 ) ( 1920 = 0.205346294 ) ( 1922 = 0.267360049 ) 
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( 1923 = 0.244432662 ) ( 1924 = 0.251795977 ) ( 1925 = 0.228795438 ) ( 1926 = 0.190427699 ) ( 1927 = 
0.197802198 ) ( 1928 = 0.143041237 ) ( 1929 = 0.155526992 ) ( 1931 = 0.214301052 ) ( 1933 = 0.161519199 ) 
( 1936 = 0.15465995 ) ( 1938 = 0.185032895 ) ( 1939 = 0.207426376 ) ( 1940 = 0.186825054 ) ( 1941 = 
0.185826123 ) ( 1942 = 0.227009322 ) ( 1943 = 0.183031459 )( 2002 = 0.201504567 ) ( 2003 = 0.285238841 ) ( 
2004 = 0.292205481 ) ( 2011 = 0.281714043 ) ( 2012 = 0.297111504 ) ( 2014 = 0.174528302 ) ( 2015 = 
0.170403587 ) ( 2017 = 0.194228635 ) ( 2018 = 0.171669794 ) ( 2019 = 0.211580481 ) ( 2020 = 0.233574442 ) 
( 2021 = 0.298167188 ) ( 2022 = 0.192238267 ) ( 2023 = 0.206793207 ) ( 2024 = 0.174712644 ) ( 2025 = 
0.226415094 ) ( 2027 = 0.219849246 ) ( 2028 = 0.16991342 ) ( 2030 = 0.276782536 )  
 




// Centrality, kontinuerlig: 
 
recode bosted (101 = 843) (104 = 932) (105 = 887) (106 = 884) (111 = 725) (118 = 660) (119 = 742) (121 = 
667) (122 = 799) (123 = 865) (124 = 893) (125 = 853) (127 = 789) (128 = 794) (135 = 838) (136 = 890) (137 = 
822) (138 = 845) (211 = 880) (213 = 914) (214 = 899) (215 = 906) (216 = 855) (217 = 929) (219 = 971) (220 = 
936) (221 = 799) (226 = 869) (227 = 880) (228 = 942) (229 = 817) (230 = 976) (231 = 973) (233 = 885) (234 = 
887) (235 = 909) (236 = 817) (237 = 847) (238 = 833) (239 = 730) (301 = 1000) (402 = 799) (403 = 876) (412 = 
786) (415 = 792) (417 = 814) (418 = 718) (419 = 779) (420 = 698) (423 = 668) (425 = 669) (426 = 669) (427 = 
762) (428 = 609) (429 = 627) (430 = 552) (432 = 491) (434 = 438) (436 = 559) (437 = 660) (438 = 584) (439 = 
518) (441 = 578) (501 = 823) (502 = 803) (511 = 580) (512 = 542) (513 = 562) (514 = 572) (515 = 623) (516 = 
652) (517 = 637) (519 = 620) (520 = 658) (521 = 699) (522 = 686) (528 = 731) (529 = 769) (532 = 778) (533 = 
785) (534 = 784) (536 = 676) (538 = 683) (540 = 579) (541 = 587) (542 = 672) (543 = 598) (544 = 601) (545 = 
522) (602 = 933) (604 = 850) (605 = 815) (612 = 800) (615 = 563) (616 = 660) (617 = 697) (618 = 629) (619 = 
662) (620 = 640) (621 = 662) (622 = 622) (623 = 812) (624 = 856) (625 = 897) (626 = 896) (627 = 883) (628 = 
810) (631 = 703) (632 = 588) (633 = 537) (701 = 889) (704 = 891) (710 = 870) (711 = 761) (712 = 850) (713 = 
851) (715 = 842) (716 = 821) (729 = 843) (805 = 860) (806 = 846) (807 = 762) (811 = 666) (814 = 775) (815 = 
741) (817 = 633) (819 = 713) (821 = 747) (822 = 709) (826 = 599) (827 = 589) (828 = 638) (829 = 608) (830 = 
538) (831 = 466) (833 = 544) (834 = 553) (901 = 704) (904 = 812) (906 = 803) (911 = 661) (912 = 583) (914 = 
711) (919 = 701) (926 = 787) (928 = 711) (929 = 574) (935 = 634) (937 = 691) (938 = 564) (940 = 485) (941 = 
472) (1001 = 857) (1002 = 783) (1003 = 695) (1004 = 690) (1014 = 765) (1017 = 764) (1018 = 785) (1021 = 
647) (1026 = 549) (1027 = 613) (1029 = 686) (1032 = 713) (1034 = 600) (1037 = 657) (1046 = 602) (1101 = 
753) (1102 = 887) (1103 = 908) (1106 = 831) (1111 = 664) (1112 = 637) (1114 = 697) (1119 = 786) (1120 = 
854) (1121 = 843) (1122 = 807) (1124 = 872) (1127 = 877) (1129 = 651) (1130 = 722) (1133 = 540) (1134 = 
528) (1135 = 632) (1141 = 632) (1142 = 730) (1144 = 507) (1145 = 626) (1146 = 723) (1149 = 764) (1151 = 
315) (1160 1154 = 658) (1201 = 902) (1211 = 613) (1216 = 679) (1219 = 645) (1221 = 734) (1222 = 593) (1223 
= 572) (1224 = 593) (1227 = 484) (1228 = 659) (1231 = 532) (1232 = 547) (1233 = 552) (1234 = 591) (1235 = 
737) (1238 = 677) (1241 = 618) (1242 = 690) (1243 = 788) (1244 = 595) (1245 = 694) (1246 = 814) (1247 = 
814) (1251 = 650) (1252 = 527) (1253 = 712) (1256 = 768) (1259 = 695) (1260 = 677) (1263 = 742) (1264 = 
660) (1265 = 431) (1266 = 544) (1401 = 706) (1411 = 478) (1412 = 368) (1413 = 505) (1416 = 565) (1417 = 
536) (1418 = 547) (1419 = 617) (1420 = 695) (1421 = 543) (1422 = 563) (1424 = 606) (1426 = 582) (1428 = 
524) (1429 = 584) (1430 = 608) (1431 = 576) (1432 = 752) (1433 = 625) (1438 = 491) (1439 = 632) (1441 = 
522) (1443 = 640) (1444 = 611) (1445 = 637) (1449 = 616) (1502 = 774) (1504 = 827) (1505 1503 = 766) (1511 
= 551) (1514 = 572) (1515 = 679) (1516 = 732) (1517 = 698) (1519 = 727) (1520 = 725) (1523 = 700) (1524 = 
546) (1525 = 629) (1526 = 620) (1528 = 692) (1529 = 722) (1531 = 743) (1532 = 720) (1534 = 653) (1535 = 
653) (1539 = 629) (1543 = 557) (1545 = 573) (1546 = 466) (1547 = 623) (1548 = 666) (1551 = 638) (1554 = 
632) (1557 = 595) (1560 = 584) (1563 = 645) (1566 = 615) (1567 = 603) (1571 = 510) (1573 = 465) (1576 = 
513) (1804 = 801) (1805 = 711) (1811 = 429) (1812 = 510) (1813 = 621) (1815 = 413) (1816 = 381) (1818 = 
490) (1820 = 668) (1822 = 568) (1824 = 704) (1825 = 496) (1826 = 456) (1827 = 430) (1828 = 520) (1832 = 
575) (1833 = 714) (1834 = 368) (1835 = 350) (1836 = 355) (1837 = 495) (1838 = 485) (1839 = 454) (1840 = 
606) (1841 = 681) (1845 = 563) (1848 = 427) (1849 = 437) (1850 = 423) (1851 = 559) (1852 = 510) (1853 = 
545) (1854 = 523) (1856 = 387) (1857 = 404) (1859 = 477) (1860 = 637) (1865 = 644) (1866 = 601) (1867 = 
534) (1868 = 568) (1870 = 683) (1871 = 536) (1874 = 462) (1902 = 808) (1903 = 744) (1911 = 593) (1913 = 
566) (1917 = 453) (1919 = 501) (1920 = 516) (1922 = 600) (1923 = 572) (1924 = 602) (1925 = 621) (1926 = 
505) (1927 = 514) (1928 = 426) (1929 = 453) (1931 = 645) (1933 = 571) (1936 = 448) (1938 = 481) (1939 = 
523) (1940 = 446) (1941 = 570) (1942 = 581) (1943 = 444) (2002 = 529) (2003 = 643) (2004 = 700) (2011 = 
494) (2012 = 721) (2014 = 377) (2015 = 368) (2017 = 468) (2018 = 415) (2019 = 535) (2020 = 567) (2021 = 
573) (2022 = 440) (2023 = 413) (2024 = 441) (2025 = 501) (2027 = 483) (2028 = 552) (2030 = 640) (1601 = 
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898) (1702 = 736) (1703 = 723) (1612 = 638) (1613 = 559) (1617 = 562) (1620 = 559) (1621 = 646) (1622 = 
587) (1627 = 591) (1630 = 546) (1632 = 433) (1633 = 462) (1634 = 668) (1635 = 606) (1636 = 641) (1638 = 
779) (1640 = 669) (1644 = 532) (1648 = 662) (1653 = 778) (1657 = 745) (1662 = 793) (1663 = 813) (1664 = 
663) (1665 = 504) (1711 = 629) (1714 = 799) (1717 = 649) (1719 = 762) (1721 = 750) (1724 = 585) (1725 = 
575) (1736 = 546) (1738= 422) (1739 = 419) (1740 = 436) (1742 = 581) (1743 = 541) (1744 = 638) (1748 = 
486) (1749 = 478) (1750 = 612) (1751 = 547) (1755 = 406) (1756 = 676) (5054 = 629) 
 
drop if bosted == 2580 | bosted == 9999 
 
 
///////// Dependent variable 
 
// 0 = Utdanning på ulikt presitisje nivå enn mor og far 
// 1 = helt lik utdanning som far 
// 2 = helt lik utdanning som mor 
 
 
generate elite = 0 
replace elite = 1 if utdfelt == utdfar  





// For alle (uten if-betingelse) 
mlogit elite i.mann#c.timelønnmor_gj10 i.mann#c.timelønnfar_gj10 i.mann#c.gjarbtimer_mor_uke 





mlogit elite i.mann#c.timelønnmor_gj10 i.mann#c.timelønnfar_gj10 i.mann#c.gjarbtimer_mor_uke 





mlogit elite i.mann#c.timelønnmor_gj10 i.mann#c.timelønnfar_gj10 i.mann#c.gjarbtimer_mor_uke 





mlogit elite i.mann#c.timelønnmor_gj10 i.mann#c.timelønnfar_gj10 i.mann#c.gjarbtimer_mor_uke 
i.mann#c.gjarbtimer_far_uke c.bosted c.andel_høyereutd if utdfelt == 21 | utdfelt == 22 | utdfelt == 23 | utdfelt 
== 26 , mfx(dydx)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
